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The curse of reproducibility
Who wants to go on for N months to reproduce this?
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 1
A Scalable Formulation of Probabilistic Linear
Discriminant Analysis: Applied to Face Recognition
Laurent El Shafey, Chris McCool, Roy Wallace, and Se´bastien Marcel
APPENDIX A
MATHEMATICAL DERIVATIONS
The goal of the following section is to provide more detailed
proofs of the formulae given in the article for both training
and computing the likelihood.
The following proofs make use of a formulation of the
inverse of a block matrix that uses the Schur complement.
The corresponding identity can be found in [1] (Equations
1.11 and 1.10),
L M
N O
  1
=
R,  RMO 1
 O 1NR, O 1 +O 1NRMO 1
 
, (51)
where we have substituted R =
 
L MO 1N  1.
Another related expression is the Woodbury matrix identity
(Equation C.7 of [2]), which states that,
(L+MON)
 1
=
L 1  L 1M  O 1 +NL 1M  1NL 1. (52)
A. Scalable training
The bottleneck of the training procedure is the expectation
step (E-Step) of the Expectation-Maximization algorithm. This
E-Step requires the computation of the first and second order
moments of the latent variables.
1) Estimating the first order moment of the Latent Vari-
ables: The most computationally expensive part when es-
timating the latent variables is the inversion of the matrix
˚˜P (Equation (27)). This matrix is block diagonal, the two
blocks being P0 (Equation (28)) and (a repetition of) P1
(Equation (29)),
˚˜P =
266664
P0 0 · · · 0
0 P1 . . . 0
0
. . . . . . 0
0 · · · 0 P1
377775 . (53)
The inverse of P1 is equal to the matrix G, defined by
(30). This matrix is of constant size (DG ⇥DG), irrespective
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of the number of training samples for the class. In addition,
the inversion of P0 can be further optimised using the block
matrix inversion identity introduced at the beginning of this
section, leading to
P 10 =
" FJi pJiHTp
JiH
⇣
IDG   JiHF T⌃ 1G
⌘
G
#
, (54)
where FJi is defined by (33) and H by (37).
Then, the computation of ˚˜P 1˚˜AT ⌃˜ 1 gives a block diag-
onal matrix, the first block being" p
JiFJiF TS
GGT⌃ 1
⇣
IDx   JiFFJiF TS
⌘# ,
and the other ones being equal to GGT⌃ 1.
As explained in section III.B.a of the article, hi corresponds
to the upper sub-vector of ˚˜yi and is not affected by the change
of variable, as depicted in (21). Therefore, the first order
moment of hi is directly obtained by multiplying the first
block-rows of the matrix ˚˜P 1˚˜AT ⌃˜ 1 with ˚˜xi, which gives
(31).
Considering only the ˚˜wi (lower) sub-vector of ˚˜yi, the
corresponding (lower) part ˚˜B of the matrix ˚˜P 1˚˜AT ⌃˜ 1 can
be decomposed into a sum of two matrices, the first one
being sparse with a single non-zero block (upper left) equal
to B0 =  JiGGT⌃ 1FFJiF TS, and the second one being
diagonal by blocks with identical blocks B1 = GGT⌃ 1,
˚˜B =
24B0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
35+
264B1 0 00 . . . 0
0 0 B1
375 . (55)
Furthermore, the first order moment of the variables w˜i is
given by
E [w˜i|x˜i,⇥] =
⇣
U˜
T ⌦ IDG
⌘24B0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
35˚˜xi (56)
+
⇣
U˜
T ⌦ IDG
⌘264B1 0 00 . . . 0
0 0 B1
375⇣U˜ ⌦ IDx⌘ x˜i.
The previous decomposition greatly simplifies the compu-
tation, and leads to the following expression for each wi,j ,
E [wi,j |x˜i,⇥] = GGT⌃ 1x¯i,j
  GGT⌃ 1FFJiF TS
X
j
x¯i,j (57)
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Fig. 10: Score distributions of baseline face verification systems. The full green line shows how SFAR changes with moving
the threshold.
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Fig. 12: EPSC for comparison of fusion techniques of baselines with LBP anti-spoofing algorithm
D. Performance of fused systems
In our last experiment, we compare the four face verification
systems when fused with ALL counter-measures using PLR
fusion scheme. Firstly, we illustrate how fusion changes the
score distribution for each of them separately in Figure 14.
Then, in Figure 15 we compare which of the fused systems
performs the best.
While Figure 10 shows that the spoofing attacks of Replay-
Attack are in the optimal category when fed to the baseline
face verification systems, Figure 14 illustrates that their effec-
tiveness has vastly changed after fusion. The score distribution
of the spoofing attacks is now mostly overlapping with the
score distribution of the zero-effort impostors, allowing for
better discriminability between the positive class and the two
negative classes. The results are reflecting this observation:
even when the threshold is obtained using the licit scenario,
SFAR has dropped to less then 6%.
The comparison between the EPSC curves given in Fig-
ure 11(a) and Figure 15(a), confirms the above observations:
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Fig. 15: EPSC curves to compare fused systems
while HTER! increases rapidly with ! and reaches up to 25%
for some of the baseline systems, it increases very mildly
and does not exceed 4.1% for the fused systems. The major
augmentation of the robustness to spoofing of the systems after
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Questions you may pose yourself
1. How long will it take?
2. Are there untold hidden parameters?
3. Are there numerical optimization tricks not reported?
4. Does it generalize beyond the reported task(s)?
5. Will I have enough computing power?
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Alternative Universe
For each asset on a publication, you’re given an URL:
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of the number of training samples for the class. In addition,
the inversion of P0 can be further optimised using the block
matrix inversion identity introduced at the beginning of this
section, leading to
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where FJi is defined by (33) and H by (37).
Then, the computation of ˚˜P 1˚˜AT ⌃˜ 1 gives a block diag-
onal matrix, the first block being" p
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GGT⌃ 1
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and the other ones being equal to GGT⌃ 1.
As explained in section III.B.a of the article, hi corresponds
to the upper sub-vector of ˚˜yi and is not affected by the change
of variable, as depicted in (21). Therefore, the first order
moment of hi is directly obtained by multiplying the first
block-rows of the matrix ˚˜P 1˚˜AT ⌃˜ 1 with ˚˜xi, which gives
(31).
Considering only the ˚˜wi (lower) sub-vector of ˚˜yi, the
corresponding (lower) part ˚˜B of the matrix ˚˜P 1˚˜AT ⌃˜ 1 can
be decomposed into a sum of two matrices, the first one
being sparse with a single non-zero block (upper left) equal
to B0 =  JiGGT⌃ 1FFJiF TS, and the second one being
diagonal by blocks with identical blocks B1 = GGT⌃ 1,
˚˜B =
24B0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
35+
264B1 0 00 . . . 0
0 0 B1
375 . (55)
Furthermore, the first order moment of the variables w˜i is
given by
E [w˜i|x˜i,⇥] =
⇣
U˜
T ⌦ IDG
⌘24B0 0 00 0 0
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⌘264B1 0 00 . . . 0
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The previous decomposition greatly simplifies the compu-
tation, and leads to the following expression for each wi,j ,
E [wi,j |x˜i,⇥] = GGT⌃ 1x¯i,j
  GGT⌃ 1FFJiF TS
X
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Fig. 10: Score distributions of baseline face verification systems. The full green line shows how SFAR changes with moving
the threshold.
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D. Performance of fused systems
In our last experiment, we compare the four face verification
systems when fused with ALL counter-measures using PLR
fusion scheme. Firstly, we illustrate how fusion changes the
score distribution for each of them separately in Figure 14.
Then, in Figure 15 we compare which of the fused systems
performs the best.
While Figure 10 shows that the spoofing attacks of Replay-
Attack are in the optimal category when fed to the baseline
face verification systems, Figure 14 illustrates that their effec-
tiveness has vastly changed after fusion. The score distribution
of the spoofing attacks is now mostly overlapping with the
score distribution of the zero-effort impostors, allowing for
better discriminability between the positive class and the two
negative classes. The results are reflecting this observation:
even when the threshold is obtained using the licit scenario,
SFAR has dropped to less then 6%.
The comparison between the EPSC curves given in Fig-
ure 11(a) and Figure 15(a), confirms the above observations:
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Fig. 15: EPSC curves to compare fused systems
while HTER! increases rapidly with ! and reaches up to 25%
for some of the baseline systems, it increases very mildly
and does not exceed 4.1% for the fused systems. The major
augmentation of the robustness to spoofing of the systems after
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BEAT Platform
Open Science for all:
I Accessible: no need to install extra software
I Intuitive: graphically connect blocks to run experiments
I Social:
I Do research alone or in self-organized teams
I Engage to your community and get more processing power
I Productive:
I Integrate data, compute, versioning, editing and displaying in a
single platform
I Search the state-of-the-art by any filtering criteria
I Data Privacy:
I No need to handle large-scale databases
I Can run on un-distributable data (e.g. proprietary databases)
I Assurance:
I fair (reproducible) evaluations of algorithms
I online attestations for all produced results
I Free: build on open-source software and standards
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BEAT Platform: Accessibility
To use the platform, you only need a web browser:
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BEAT Platform: User Page
The user page provides an overview of latest changes by you or
connections
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BEAT Platform: Search
Search for results and learn about trends easily
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BEAT Platform: Reproducing
Reproducing experiments is one click away
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BEAT Platform: Algorithms
You can create algorithms by forking or from scratch
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BEAT Platform: Toolchains
You can also create new “workflows” or toolchains
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BEAT Platform: Databases
Databases are insert into the platform by administrators
Andre´ Anjos and Se´bastien Marcel September 29, 2017 11 / 18
BEAT Platform: Environments and Parallelization
Choose the processing queue, environment and parallelization
options
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BEAT Platform: Privacy
We adopt and opt-in methodology - everything is private by default
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BEAT Platform: Caching
As experiments execute, data transmitted between blocks is cached
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BEAT Platform: Certification
Experiments can be certified by the platform
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BEAT Platform: Reports
Generate paper-like reports where everything is reproducible
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Future Plans
Currently working on. . .
I GPU support
I Better Report interface: which feels almost like an article
I Better Plotting support (integrate with external tools?)
I Better tools for moving frameworks into the platform
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Try it!
Looking for interested parties to play with it:
https://www.beat-eu.org/platform/
I Register for free
I Contact us:
I Andre´ Anjos <andre.anjos@idiap.ch>
I Se´bastien Marcel <sebastien.marcel@idiap.ch>
I For:
I Hosting competitions
I Hosting your dataset
I Interesting projects
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